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THE UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT:
A FIRST LOOK
ROBERT KRATOVilP
INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA)l is designed to
accomplish for real estate transactions what the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) accomplished for personal property. Work began on this
project in 1970. At the August, 1974 meeting of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners, the Committee of the Whole gave its approval
to articles I to V of the Act. They are: article I, General Provisions;
article II, Contracts and Conveyances; article III, Secured Transac-
tions; article IV, Condominiums; and article V, Construction Liens.2
A special committee of Commissioners charged with the task of draft-
ing the ULTA meets periodically to consider materials drafted by
Allison Dunham (Chairman), Marion Benfield (Reporter-Draftsman),
and Peter B. Maggs (Reporter-Draftsman). Meeting with them is an
Advisory Committee composed of representatives of consumers and
various interested trade groups, e.g., bankers, mortgage bankers, title
insurers, and life insurance companies. When materials are deemed
ready for submission to the National Conference, a line-by-line reading
takes place in the National Commissioners Committee of the Whole
and motions to amend, strike, or approve are voted upon by that Com-
mittee. In this fashion articles I to V were finalized.
The stated purposes of the Act are set forth in section 1-102(b) as
follows:
(1) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing real
estate transactions;
0 Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. Until December 30, 1974, the author
served as vice president of Chicago Title Insurance Co. and was a member of the advisory
committee for the Uniform Land Transactions Act.
1 A special committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws is in charge of preparing the working draft of the Uniform Land Transactions Act.
To date, this draft has not been passed upon by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. Throughout this article, references and citations to sections and comments of the
ULTA are to the February 1975 working draft. Since the entire draft will not be repro-
duced herein, those wishing to obtain a copy may contact the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 645 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60611.
The ULTA is primarily concerned with real estate transactions and hence the
acronym is somewhat of a misnomer. This was deemed, however, to be more acceptable
than the UREA.
2The articles yet to be approved are: article VI, Statutory Liens and Notices of
Pending Proceedings; article VII, Conveyancing, Recording and Priorities; article VIII,
Public Land Records; and article IX, Effective Date and Repealer.
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(2) to promote the interstate flow of funds for real estate
transactions;
(3) to protect consumer buyers and borrowers against prac-
tices which may cause unreasonable risk and loss to them; and
(4) to make uniform the law among the states enacting it.
Of course, the ULTA has other objectives. Principal among
these, although unstated, is that a code of real estate law should be
modeled after the UCO. This objective rests on the possibly question-
able assumption that real estate transactions do not differ greatly from
chattel transactions. In accordance with this underlying assumption,
presumably case law developed in connection with the UCC would be
applicable to the ULTA. This observation was often repeated by
Professor Dunham.
Another objective was to make possible the development of simple
mortgage documents. These simple mortgages could be quickly and
inexpensively foreclosed by typical power of sale procedures8 rather
than by judicial foreclosure, although the latter would still be per-
mitted. Redemption would be virtually abolished. The philosophy
behind this portion of the ULTA is given in the introductory com-
ment to article III, which reads, in part, as follows:
It is not really necessary to remind the reader that this Article
covers the portion of real estate law where the need and desir-
ability of uniformity is most pressing. Thus in H.R. 10688 and
S. 2507, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess., a federal proposal to establish a uni-
form foreclosure system for mortgages insured, guaranteed or
owned by federal agencies, there is a proposed Congressional
finding which sets forth important reasons for uniformity;
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS
"SEC. 402. The Congress finds-
(1) that disparate State laws relating to the foreclosure of
S In the aftermath of Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 837 (1969), and Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), there was considerable debate as to whether typical power
of sale foreclosures were constitutional in the absence of prior notice and hearing for
the benefit of the defaulting mortgagor. See, e.g., Note, California's Nonjudicial Fore-
closure Notice Requirements and the "Sniadach Progeny," 9 CAUF. W.L. Rav. 290 (1973);
Note, Mortgages-Does Foreclosure Under Power of Sale Violate Due Process Rights?,
4 Cum.-SArM. L. Ruv. 507 (1974); Note, Nonjudicial Foreclosure Under a Deed of Trust:
Some Problems of Notice, 49 TExAs L. Ra,. 1085 (1971). The problem, however, has not
yet been completely resolved. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Assoc., 372 F. Supp. 594
(E.D. Mich 1974).
Recent case law, however, has consistently upheld state statutes authorizing nonjudicial
power of sale foreclosures against such attacks. See, e.g., Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Hoffman v. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 371
F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Law v. Dep't of Agric., 366 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973);
Ruff v. Lee, 230 Ga. 426, 197 SE.2d 376 (1973).
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real estate mortgages and deeds of trust have inhibited the
free flow of mortgage money to homeowners at reasonable
rates in many States and regions of the Nation have burdened
Federal programs involving real estate mortgages made,
owned, insured or guaranteed by the United States;
(2) that delays in completing real estate foreclosures have
increased the risks of vandalism, fire loss, depredation, dam-
.age and waste and that resulting losses have burdened Federal
programs involving real estate mortgages;
(3) that delays in foreclosure generally and delays in the
transfer of title due to redemption periods observed in some
States have encouraged the practice known as "equity skim-
ming" with consequent financial loss to the Government,
homeowners, and mortgagees generally .... -4
The article on Condominiums is basically intended to modernize
and make uniform the law on this subject. The rapid growth of con-
dominiums during the past ten years and the projection that they are
to become the dominant form of home ownership demand that the
multiplicity of state condominium acts be brought under a single
unified body of law.
The article on Construction Liens" is intended to attract money
to the mortgage market by giving a construction mortgage total pri-
ority over mechanics' liens arising during the course of construction.
This article will most probably generate a good deal of controversy.
Another important objective of the ULTA is to simplify title
searching, hopefully making the process less expensive. This is to be
accomplished by enactment of a uniform Marketable Title Act and a
number of short limitation statutes to cure title defects.7 In this regard,
the Act anticipates the ultimate utilization of computers in moderniz-
ing the entire process of recording and searching titles.
It is quite evident that the ULTA purports to introduce revolu-
tionary change in the law of real property. The discussion of the
ULTA herein is limited to articles I and II. Hopefully this will serve
to introduce the Act to the bar, which now appears to be largely un-
aware of the existence of this important proposed legislation. Addi-
tionally, an analysis of the thinking which went into the preparation
of these two articles should provide an insight into the manner in
which the ULTA hopes to achieve its stated objectives. Selected sec-
4 ULTA art. 3, Introductory Comment.
5 Id. art. 4.
6 Id. art. 5.
7 See generally Snas & TAYLOR, IMPROVEMMNT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION
(1960).
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tions of the Act will be fully quoted as an aid to placing this com-
mentary in its proper perspective.
ARTICLE I
Construction
The UCC has found application to transactions falling outside of
its scope. As early as 1951 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
in Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co.,8 drawing
upon a rule of law stated in the Code, said, in a footnote, "[w]e think
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code which do not conflict
with statute or settled case law are entitled to as much respect and
weight as courts have been inclined to give to the various Restate-
ments. It, like the Restatements, has the stamp of approval of a large
body of American scholarship."9 Thus, like the peasant who was
startled to find that he had been speaking prose all his life, we find
that large portions of the legislation the Commissioners are struggling
to frame are already "on the books," so to speak.
Since much of the ULTA is taken from the UCC, both the Com-
ments and case law relevant to the UCC are equally relevant to the
ULTA. Indeed, this was one of Professor Dunham's expressed goals.
In those instances where the present draft of the ULTA differs
from prior drafts, the inference is warranted that a meaningful change
was intended. At one time the UCC contained a provision that "prior
drafts of text and comments may not be used to ascertain legislative
intent."' 0 This language vanished, no doubt because it was devoid of
logic and because legislatures ought not go about telling courts how
the latter should perform their functions.", Accordingly, variations in
the various UCC drafts have frequently been utilized in order to con-
strue the UCC. 12
Originally the UCC provided that the Comments could be con-
8 190 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1951).
9Id. at 822 n.9. See generally Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code: Review,
Assessment, Prospect -November, 1959, 15 Bus. Lw. 348, 260-65 (1960); Note, The Uni-
form Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 CoLUM. L. R1v. 880 (1965).
10 UNIFOM CoAMERCULAI CODE § 1-102(3)(g) (1953 version) [hereinafter cited as UCC].
All further UCC citations are to the 1962 Official Text unless otherwise indicated. See
generally Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLuM.
L. REv. 798 (1958).
11 It has been suggested with respect to the UCC, however, that "lawyers cannot base
reliable inferences as to the intended meaning of enacted text on changes made from
prior versions of that text." J. WHrrE & R. Suznimts, UNiFoRm COmmFRCIAL Cooa § 4, at
10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WrrE & SusrmSa]. The authors suggest that former § 1-102
(3)(g), which appeared in the 1953 version should not have been deleted. Id.
12 See, e.g., Comment, Future Advance Security Interests and the 1971 Revision of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1971 U. IrT. L.F. 496.
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sulted as an aid to construction of the text, but warned that text
controls in the event of conflict between the two.'3 In the process of
revision, this provision was removed. 14 To the extent that the Com-
ments were not laid before legislatures adopting the UCC, they lack
official status. And to the extent that they were prepared after the UCC
was written, they may or may not be legislative history.15 In point of
fact, however, the courts always consider the Comments.16 But, it is
important to note that the Comments can be misleading at times. 17 In
the case of the ULTA, some Comments appear in the August 1974
Draft but others will follow. Because not all legislatures will be in a
position to fully review the so-called "Official Comments," it should be
emphasized that they are not really official, nor are they part of the
statute.
Definitions and General Provisions
As was stated above, a proper understanding of the ULTA re-
quires some familiarity with the UCC. Indeed, much of article I will
be seen to follow conceptually the 1962 Official Text of the UCC.
However, in keeping with one of its stated objectives, i.e., consumer
protection, article I introduces a new concept, that of a protected
party. The protected party is one "who contracts to give a real estate
security interest in, or to buy, or to have improved residential real
estate all or a part of which he occupies or intends to occupy as a resi-
dence."' 8 Residential real estate is defined so as to limit such real
estate to a structure of not more than four dwelling units (an FHA
concept) and to land containing not more than three acres.19 The pro-
tected party, as will be seen, receives a number of special safeguards
in the ULTA. Favored treatment in the foreclosure process, 20 and
18 UCC § 1-102(3)(f) (1953 version).
14 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS or Tm EDITORIAL BOARD or THE UNIFORM COMERCIAL
CODE 3 (1957); see Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1966 WIs. L. REv. 597 [hereinafter cited as Skilton].
15 Compare I N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
158-60 (1955) (various judicial references to the Comments seen as indication that the
courts consider the Comments to be "part of the 'legislative history'"), quoted in
Skilton, supra note 14, at 604 n.19, with Note, Warranty Disclaimers and Limitation of
Remedy for Breach of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 43 B.U.L. REv.
396, 403 (1963) (suggesting that comments "do not qualify as legislative history").
16 See, e.g., cases cited in Skilton, supra note 14, at 598 n.3.
17 See WHITE & SumaERs, supra note 11, § 4, at 12-13.
18ULTA § 1-203(a)(1).
19 Id. § 1-203(b).
20Id. § 3-506.
[Vol. 49:460
UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT
prohibitions against certain waivers of warranties21 and modification
of remedies2 provide immediate examples.
This concept of protected party, however, is likely to provoke
some controversy since it will bring within its ambit seemingly un-
intended individuals. For example, it applies regardless of value. The
owner of a million-dollar mansion is a protected party. In addition, it
applies not only to one's principal home but to his summer and winter
home as well.23 Finally, since it applies to one who acquires a residence
subject to a mortgage placed thereon by a protected party,2 4 a large
corporation acquiring a mortgaged home from an employee in an em-
ployee-transfer program is a protected party.
Good Faith and Unconscionability
SECION 1-201. [General Definitions.] Subject to additional defini-
tions contained in subsequent Articles which are applicable to
specific Articles or Parts thereof, and unless the context other-
wise requires, in this Act the following definitions apply.
(h) "Good faith" means honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable standards of fair dealing in the conduct or transac-
tion involved.
SECTION 1-301. [Obligation of Good Faith.] Every contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement.
SECrION 1-311. [Unconscionable Agreement or Term of Con-
tract.]
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds that a contract or
contract clause was unconscionable at the time it was made, the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder
of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or limit the
application of any unconscionable clause in order to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(b) Whenever it is claimed or appears to the court that a
contract or any contract clause may be unconscionable, the parties
in order to aid the court in making the determination, shall be
211d. § 2-311(c).
22 Id. § 2-517(d).
23 Id. § 1-203, Comment.
241d. § 1-203(a)(3).
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afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to
(1) the commercial setting of the negotiations,
(2) whether the seller, lessor, or lender has knowingly
taken advantage of the inability of the other party reasonably
to protect his interests by reason of physical or mental in-
firmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the
language or meaning of the agreement, or similar factors,
(3) the effect and purpose of the contract or clause, and
(4) if a sale, any gross disparity, at the time of contract-
ing, between the amount charged for the real estate and value
of the real estate measured by the price at which similar real
estate was readily obtainable in similar transactions.
The definition of good faith in section 1-201(h) will be seen to
follow closely that of article II (Sales) in the UCC25 and that of the Re-
statement of Contracts. 2 It is important that the good faith and
unconscionability provisions be read in conjunction with one another.
Together, they operate with a "push-pull" force on every contract. The
good faith definition enables the court to "push" into a contract a
provision the court finds necessary to accomplish a fair result. The
unconscionability section enables the court to "pull" from the contract
provisions that tend to lead to an unfair result. The courts, it is clear,
will play a highly activist role in making, remaking, and unmaking
contracts.
This is not to say, of course, that the contemplated judicial role
is something new. Courts have always done something akin to this.
Equity often did so openly, while law courts used imaginative flank-
ing devices. They found failure of consideration, lack of consideration,
lack of mutual assent, duress or fraud, or resorted to strained inter-
pretation - all toward the end of achieving a just result. It is almost as
if courts were ashamed of their normal and natural role, the seeking
of justice. The oddity of this attitude becomes even more apparent
when one remembers that in their early struggles with contracts, both
law courts and equity courts refused to enforce unfair contracts. 2'
Corbin recognized this process long ago. In contract law, he said,
we must recognize the presence of "constructive conditions." These
25 See UCO § 2-103.
26 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcs § 231 (1972).
27 See Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 I-AIv. L.
REv. 917, 923-24 (1974), where the author points out that "[t]he most important aspect of
the eighteenth century conception of exchange [was] an equitable limitation on con-
tractual obligation." Id. at 923. Courts of equity would not enforce contracts if the
consideration was inadequate. Id. The law courts arrived at a similar result by the use of
a "substantive doctrine of consideration which allowed the jury to take into account not
only whether there was consideration, but also whether it was adequate, before awarding
damages." Id. at 924.
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conditions are not to be found in the terms of the contract or any im-
plication therefrom. Rather, they are put there by the courts to make
the contract conform to the mores and practices of the community.28
For example, if V contracts to sell Blackacre to P, and nothing is said
about the quality of the title to be furnished by V, every court will
read into the contract a requirement that seller furnish a marketable
title free from encumbrances. Once it is recognized that this process is
a timeworn practice, courts will accustom themselves to resorting to
it freely. The great contribution of Corbin, the UCC, the Restatement
of Contracts Second, and the Restatement of Property Second is that
they bring this process out into the open, something the first Restate-
ment of Contracts seemed unwilling to do. The concept of a "construc-
tive condition," however, is to be shelved in favor of the notion of
"good faith." 29 Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the
constructive condition has not disappeared. It has merely acquired a
new name. In passing, one notes that the urge to get rid of the word
"constructive" is not likely to have much success.30
The unconscionability section, like that governing good faith,
follows its counterpart in the UCC.1 In addition, it borrows from the
Restatement of Contracts82 and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.83
Of particular interest is section 1-311 (b)(4). This section will create
consternation for the real property bar. In chattel transactions, estab-
lishing the market value of consumer goods presents few difficulties.
But in large-scale real estate transactions the problems are for-
midable indeed. The results of appraisals can vary greatly. Particularly
in land assemblies there is a wild variation in price between the first
parcels acquired and those acquired in the last stages after news of the
assembly has leaked out.4 Moreover, there is a subjective aspect in
land acquisition. The land investor values land differently from the
land developer.8 5 Theoretically, an option given for $1 can be
enforced.3
28 See Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 739 (1919); 3A A.
CoRSiN, CoNrRAcrs § 632 (1963).
29 REsTATEbMENT (SECoND) OF CoNTRACTs § 252, comment c (1972).
30 See Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 CoLUm. L. Rv. 904 (1942).
The author analyzes judicial treatment of various implied conditions in contracts and
suggests that the term "constructive condition" most aptly describes conditions found in
contracts because of overriding legal principles.
31 UCC § 2-302.
32 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 234 (1972).
33 See UNIFOnt CoNsuMER CRrEDr CODE § 5.108.
84 See, e.g., Hellman, The Fine Art of Assemblage, 4 REAL ESTATE REV., Summer 1974,
at 101.
85 See, e.g., Kern, The Art of Buying Land, 3 REAL ESTATE REv., Winter 1974, at 38.
88 It is not the amount of consideration which is important, but "the value of the
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It might be preferable to add the following language to subsec-
tion 4:
provided however, a disparity between the contract price
and the value of the real estate measured by the price at
which similar real estate was readily obtainable in similar
transactions does not, of itself, render the contract uncon-
scionable.
The subsection would then be more consistent with Professor Corbin's
views.37 Options would then be accorded specific performance even
though only nominal consideration was given. A parallel commentary,
however, could elaborate that gross disparity could well render the
contract unconscionable if accompanied by inequalities in the sophis-
tication of the parties or the other circumstance mentioned by Corbin.
Land assemblies would have to be separately discussed. These simply
do not lend themselves to solution by the phrase "similar real estate
was readily obtainable in similar transactions." Each transaction in a
land assembly is different from every other transaction. Also, a party
paying a grossly inflated price for land because he expects inflation to
push the price higher ought not to be relieved of his bargain if defla-
tion occurs. This applies as well to the buyer who guesses wrong as to
the existence of a project that would push price upward.
There are two matters this section leaves unaddressed. One is the
effect of supervening unconscionability, that is, unconscionability
occurring by reason of events taking place after the making of the
contract. The ULTA speaks only of unconscionability at the time the
contract was made. The other matter is the effect of unconscionability
on executed transactions. The language of section 1-311 is couched in
terms of defending an action to enforce an unexecuted contract. That
executed transactions may later be challenged on grounds of uncon-
scionability is exemplified by a recent decision upsetting a sale that
had taken place in 1891. In the final analysis perhaps it is preferable
to leave subsequent unconscionability to the law of restitution and
unjust enrichment.38
performance to be rendered by the promisee after acceptance." IA A. CoaMN, CoNTraACs
§ 263, at 501 (1963).
37 Professor Corbin pointed out:
It is the generally prevailing rule that mere inadequacy of consideration, unac-
companied by other facts indicating artiface [sic], sharp practice, hardship, ad-
vantage taken of misfortune or ignorance, and the like, is not sufficient in itself
to prevent specific enforcement.
5A id. § 1165, at 223 (1964) (footnote omitted).
38 See generally WHm & SurmmERs, supra note 11, §§ 4-1 to -8, at 112-33, wherein the
authors point out that the most frequent remedy accorded upon a finding of uncon-
scionability under the UCC is a refusal to enforce payment of the purchase price. Id.
[Vol. 49:460
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Section 1-311(b) formerly contained a subdivision 5 which read
as follows:
(5) If an extension of credit, any gross disparity between the
amount charged for the credit extended and the value of the
credit extended measured by the charge at which similar
credit is readily obtainable in similar transactions by like
parties.89
This provision was ultimately removed. The conclusion may have
been that unconscionable mortgage interest terms would be better left
to policing under the law of usury.
Course of Dealing and Usage
SECTION 1-303. [Course of Dealing and Usage.]
(a) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct be-
tween the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be
regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for
interpreting their expressions and other conduct.
(b) A usage is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place as to justify an expectation that
it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.
The existence and scope of a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is
established that a usage is embodied in a written trade code or
similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court.
(c) A course of dealing between parties and any usage of
which they are or should be aware give particular meaning to and
supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.
(d) The express terms of an agreement and an applicable
course of dealing or usage shall be construed wherever reasonable
as consistent with each other; but when that construction is un-
reasonable express terms control both course of dealing and usage
and course of dealing controls usage.
(e) An applicable usage in the place where any part of per-
formance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement
as to that part of the performance.
Section 1-303, stating the ULTA position on usage and course of
§ 4-8, at 130-33. Indeed, it has been suggested that "[i]t is not ground for damages or for
cancellation of the executed contract." D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 10.7, at 706 (1973). There is,
however, at least some authority for the proposition that a court could modify the
terms of an executed contract properly made where payments were found to be so in-
adequate as to be unconscionable, and require that additional payments be made. See, e.g.,
Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians v. United States, 340 F.2d 368 (Ct. Cl. 1964), where the court
found that coercion and duress had been used by the Government to force the Indians
into taking an "unconscionable" price in exchange for their land, id. at 374-76. The case
was remanded to the Indian Claims Commission for a determination of the fair market
value of the land at the time of sale, the difference between such value and the purchase
price to be awarded to the petitioners. Id. at 374.
89ULTA § 1-311(b)(5) (Mar. 1, 1972 proposed draft).
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dealing, will again be seen to closely follow its counterpart in the
UCC. This provision gives new force to prior course of dealing and
usage of trade. Among other things, contractual ambiguity is no longer
required- as it was in some states- before admitting evidence of
trade usage to contradict the plain meaning of a contract term.40 More-
over, general clauses may no longer suffice to divorce a contract from
prior course of dealing and trade usage. Section 1-303 gives equal
standing to all three factors in interpreting the contract. This means
that parties wishing to be governed by the literal language of the con-
tract must state so expressly and, better yet, expressly negate trade
usage and prior course of dealing to the extent it conflicts with the
express language of the parties.41
It seems possible, however, that usage and trade practice will play
a less significant role in land transactions than in chattel transactions,
although cases involving trade usage do indeed occur in land transac-
tions.42
Waivers of Claims
SECTION 1-305. [Waiver or Renunciation of Claim or Right After
Breach.]
(a) Subject to subsection (b), a claim or right arising out of an
alleged breach of contract, including any contract creating a secu-
rity interest or giving rise to a lien, may be discharged in whole
or in part without consideration by a written waiver or renuncia-
tion signed and delivered by the aggrieved party.
(b) A waiver or renunciation under subsection (a), whether
or not for consideration, by which a party agrees to forego rights
given him by this Act or by a contract is invalid if the court as a
matter of law finds the waiver or renunciation is unconscionable
or that it was secured in an unconscionable manner. The com-
petence of the aggrieved party, any material misrepresentation,
failure to disclose, or over-reaching by the other party, and the
value of any consideration for the waiver or renunciation are
relevant to the issue of unconscionability.
40 See Note, Contract Draftsmanship Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 564, 575 & n.97 (1964).
41 The importance of such a provision is exemplified by Provident Tradesmens Bank
& Trust Co. v. Pemberton, 196 Pa. Super. 180, 173 A.2d 780, af'g per curiam 24 Pa. D. &
C.2d 720 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1961), wherein based on evidence of trade usage and
course of dealing, the court read into the contract between plaintiff bank and defendant
car dealer the requirement that the bank notify the dealer, notwithstanding a security
agreement purporting to waive notice, that a customer let his insurance lapse.
42 See, e.g., Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 46 Ill. 2d 522, 264 N.E2d
134 (1970).
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Initially, this provision was intended to give a protected party
relief against a waiver procured from him in an unconscionable
manner. The Committee of the Whole added language that subjects
the substance and effect of any waiver to examination as to uncon-
scionability. The examination is to be made "by the court as a matter
of law."43 The concept that unconscionability is a matter for the court
occurs throughout and is certainly not unique to the ULTA.44 Since
unconscionability is considered a question of law, there is no right to
a jury trial on this question. Yet determining unconscionability often
involves determining land value,45 and in condemnation cases land
value is determined by a jury. Historically unconscionability played
a larger role in equity cases than in law actions, which no doubt ex-
plains the role of the court in this area.
Section 1-305(a) provides that a waiver need not be supported by
consideration. As originally drafted it was somewhat unclear whether
this applied to a waiver of a mechanics' lien. However, the ULTA is
to be construed liberally. 6 This requires the spirit to prevail over the
letter of the law.47 Under the ULTA, waiver in its broadest sense need
not be supported by consideration. Thus, in the narrow field of
mechanics' liens, the rule applicable to the broad field of waiver gener-
ally should apply. In the final draft it is specifically recognized that a
mechanics' lien waiver need not be supported by consideration. 48
Parol Evidence and Course of Performance
SECrION 1-306. [Final Written Expression; Parol or Extrinsic
Evidence.] Terms agreed to by the parties in confirmatory memo-
randa or terms set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement may not be contradicted by
43ULTA § 1-305(b).
44 See, e.g., UCC § 2-302; UmnoRm CoNsumtn CREDrr CODE § 5.108; RESATEmENT
(SEcoND) OF CoNTRACTs § 234, comment f (1972).
45 See, e.g., ULTA § 1-311(b)(4).
46 Id. § 1-102(a).
47 See 3 SuTERLAND, STATUTORY CONSrRUCTION § 60.01 (4th ed. C. Sands 1974).
48 ULTA § 5-214. See generally Kratovil & Rohde, Mechanics' Lien Waivers and the
Requirement of Consideration, 14 DEPAur. L. REV. 243 (1965). The authors point out
that the overwhelming weight of authority supports the proposition "that the waiver
of a mechanic's lien must be supported by consideration." Id. at 243. The authors go on to
suggest, however, that the rule constitutes an impediment to modern construction lending
practices. The problem is said to arise because mortgage bankers frequently have such
waivers disregarded and thus lose their mortgage lien priority where the primary con-
tractor ails to tender actual consideration therefor. Id. at 244. It is suggested that the
amount of time and paperwork required in attempts by the mortgage lender to protect
its lien are invariably reflected in the increased cost of construction. Id. at 245.
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evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral
agreement, but may be explained or supplemented:
(1) by course of dealing or usage (Section 1-303) or by
course of performance (Section 1-308); and
(2) unless the court finds the writing to have been in-
tended as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement, by evidence of consistent additional terms.
SECTION 1-308. [Course of Performance or Practical Construc-
tion.]
(a) Whenever a contract involved repeated occasions for per-
formance by either party and the other party has knowledge of
the nature of the performance and opportunity to object to it, any
course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection
is relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
(b) The express terms of an agreement and any course of
performance, as well as any course of dealing and usage, shall be
construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other, but
whenever that construction is unreasonable, express terms control
course of performance and course of performance control both
course of dealing and usage.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b) and subject to the provi-
sions on modification, rescission and waiver, (Section 1-310), course
of performance is relevant to show a waiver or modification of any
express or other term inconsistent with the course of performance.
In an earlier draft of the ULTA subparagraph (2) of section 1-306
appeared as paragraph (3) and the following appeared as paragraph (2):
"by other evidence of the parties intention or understanding, and ....
The meaning of the change becomes clear by reference to the
concurring opinion in Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Building Corp.,0
which is, in part, as follows:
The majority opinion returns to the "objective theory" of inter-
terpretation of contracts followed by the Restatement of Contracts
and Professor Williston and which had been specifically adopted
in Alaska prior to the case of Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 455 P.2d
218 (Alaska 1969). This approach requires the court to view the
wording-of a contract objectively to ascertain whether it is clear
and unambiguous. If it is, then the obligations of the parties must
be determined from the contract itself. Only if the contract is
ambiguous may parol testimony be taken to ascertain the inten-
tion of the parties thereto.
In Alaska Placer Co. this court, while citing the previous
49 ULTA § 1-207 (May 1973 working draft).
50 493 P.2d 1296, 1805 (Alas. 1972) (Erwin, J., concurring).
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Alaska cases, relied upon the opposing theory of contractual
interpretation espoused by Professors Corbin and Wigmore. This
approach would require a hearing in every case where there is a
dispute over contractual terms in order to ascertain the actual
intention of the parties on the theory that words can mean dif-
ferent things to different people.5 '
When a deal gets into trouble, the documents are examined criti-
cally by litigation counsel. A lawyer who can depend on a court to give
effect to the plain language of the contract can give his client rational
advice. If he must indulge in conjecture as to what a judge might do
with testimony by a party as to the meaning the terms of the contract
had to such party, the situation becomes murky indeed. Corbin may
have logic on his side, but in the catalogue of human values certainty
will often rank far higher than logic. The deletion of former para-
graph (2) reflects sound thinking.
The ULTA follows the UCO presumption "that even 'final' con-
tracts are only partially integrated and that the extent of the partial
integration depends upon the parties' actual intent to include within
their agreement additional parol terms consistent with the writings.152
Prior course of dealing and usages of the business give color to the
terms actually employed in the writing. Even after the writing is
signed, course of performance may affect the apparent meaning of the
terms used in the writing. However, in case of a clear conflict between
express terms and course of performance, the express terms control,53
although course of performance may show waiver or modification.
This will undoubtedly lead to extensive use of a merger clause in
contract draftsmanship. The clause, moreover is likely to be an elab-
orate one, revealing a clear intention to detach the transaction from
its setting.
Acceptance of the Deed
SECrXON 1-309. [Effect of Acceptance of Deed on Contract Obliga-
tions.] Acceptance by a buyer or a secured party of a deed or other
instrument of conveyance is not of itself a waiver or renunciation
of any of his rights under the contract under which the deed or
other instrument of conveyance is given and does not of itself
relieve any party of the duty to perform all of his obligations
under the contract.
51Id. at 1805-06 (footnotes omitted).
52 Note, Contract Draftsmanship Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 564, 566-67 (1964). See also UCC § 2-202, Comment 1; N.Y. LAw
REViSION COMWN'N, STUDY OF TE UNIFOPM CommmacAL CODE 598, 601 (1955).
MSULTA § 1-308(b).
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Section 1-309 abolishes the rule that a contract of sale merges into
the deed at closing. This section will result in the routine insertion of
merger clauses in deeds, since ULTA permits the parties to "draft
around" most of the Code provisions. No doubt the pervasive rule
against unconscionable terms will apply to any such merger clause.
A special rule as to marketable title, however, is found in section
2-304(d), to the effect that all questions of marketability of title end at
closing. This is declarative of existing law and is an exception to the
"no merger" rule of section 1-309.
Description of Real Estate
SECTION 1-312. [Sufficiency of Description.] Except as provided in
the Article on recording, notice, and priority (Article 7) any de-
scription of the real estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific,
if it reasonably identifies the real estate.
Since this is an article I definition it applies to all ULTA docu-
ments, such as contracts, deeds, and mortgages. Under present law,
descriptions may not be totally sufficient for all purposes between the
parties to the transaction. 4 The principal exception to this general
provision is in the area of recording, which as the section indicates,
will eventually be provided for in article VII.
Assignments and Waivers of Defenses
SECTION 1-313. [Certain Assignees Subject to Defenses of Pro-
tected Party.]
(a) Notwithstanding agreement to the contrary, with respect
to a sale entered into with a protected party by a person in the
business of selling real estate, an assignee or holder in due course
of the rights of the seller is subject to all defenses of the protected
party against the seller.
(b) Notwithstanding agreement to the contrary, with respect
to a security transaction entered into with a protected party by a
lender whose security interest in the protected party's residential
real estate is subordinate to another person's Article 3 security
interest in the real estate, an assignee or holder in due course of
54 It should be noted in this connection that "[a] descriptionmay be sufficient for a
contract though inadequate for a deed." M. FRiEDMAN, CoNTaCrs AND CONVEYANCES OF
REAL PROPERTY 35 n.31 (2d ed. 1963). It should also be noted that courts will frequently
reform a conveying instrument to conform to the actual conveyance intended by the
parties but will not do so if the recorded instrument has been relied on to the detriment
of intervening parties. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Helmer, 275 111. 86, 113 N.E. 954 (1916); Lutle
v. Hulen, 128 Or. 483, 275 P. 45 (1929). See generally 1 R. PATrON & C. PATRON, LAND
Trrms § 61 et seq. (2d ed. 1957).
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the rights of the lender is subject to all defenses of the protected
party against the lender.
SECTION 1-314. [Agreement Not to Assert Defenses Against As-
signee; Modification of Sales Warranties Where Security Interest
Exists.]
(a) Subject to the provisions subjecting an assignee to de-
fenses of a protected party (Section 1-313), an agreement by a
debtor who has given a security interest in real estate, or by a
buyer or lessee of real estate, that he will not assert against an as-
signee defenses which he may have against the assignor is enforce-
able by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good
faith and without notice of a defense, to the same extent as if he
were a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under the
Article on Commercial Paper (Article 3) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. A buyer, lessee, or debtor who as a part of one trans-
action signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement
makes such an agreement.
(b) When a seller retains a purchase money security interest
in real estate the Article on Contracts and Conveyances (Article 2)
governs the sale and any disclaimer, limitation, or modification of
the seller's warranties.
Sections 1-313 and 1-314 set forth the ULTA position on defenses
to mortgages securing negotiable notes and waivers of defenses. The
majority view in this regard has been adopted to the effect that a
mortgage which either secures a negotiable note or is accompanied by
a waiver of defenses, travels free of any defenses. 5 Thus, an assignee
who takes his assignment in good faith and for value is treated in the
same fashion as a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument
under article 3 (Commercial Paper) of the UCC.56
Section 1-313, however, sets out one notable exception to this
proposition, viz., that of the protected party.57 As has been discussed
above, the protected party is a concept unique to the ULTA. Here, as
elsewhere throughout the Act, the protected party is afforded preferred
treatment. Therefore, an assignee or holder in due course of the right
of a seller is subject to all defenses of the protected party against the
seller. It should be noted, as the Comment to this section points out,
that "[a] protected party can validly waive defenses as against assignees
55 See R. KRATOVIL, MODERN M ORTGAGE LAv AND PRACrIE § 192 (1972).
56 UCC § 3-305.
57ULTA § 1-313(b).
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of first mortgagees."' ' 8 Subdivision (b) of this section is speaking specifi-
cally of the transactions between protected parties and lenders whose
security interest in the real estate is subordinate to that of another. It
was felt that to subject assignees of first mortgages to such defenses
would unnecessarily dampen their sale by prime institutional lenders.
Thus, assignees of a seller or second mortgagee will not take their
assignments free of the protected party's personal defenses.
Finally, with respect to the assignment of contracts, the ULTA
adopts the minority view that, in the absence of language or circum-
stance to the contrary, an assignee impliedly promises to perform the
duties of the assignor.59
On the whole, article I introduces little that is earth-shaking,
especially to those familiar with the UCC. The "protected party" pro-
vision seems rather generous, but seldom will wealthy homeowners
become involved in foreclosures. Unconscionability, as a concept, is
already a part of our law. The language needs polishing, but that can
easily be done. What is perhaps most significant is that the real prop-
erty bar will be compelled to begin an earnest study of the UCC.
ART=CL II
Article II deals with deeds, leases, and contracts for the sale of
land. 0
Statute of Frauds
SECTION 2-201. [Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds.]
(a) Notwithstanding agreement to the contrary and except as
otherwise provided in this section, a contract for [sic] to convey
real estate is not enforceable by judicial proceeding unless there
is a writing signed by or on behalf of the party against whom en-
forcement is sought which describes the real estate and which is
sufficient to indicate that a contract to convey has been made by
the parties.
(b) A contract not evidenced by a writing satisfying the re-
quirements of subsection (a) but which is valid in other respects is
enforceable if:
(1) it is for the conveyance of real estate for one year or
less;
58 Id. § 1-313, Comment.
59Id. § 1-315. See also Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E2d 521,
532-34 (1975).
60 One complaint that has been raised about ULTA draftsmanship, particularly with
reference to Article II, is that its definitions are marked with an ineptitude characteristic
of the UCC. Compare, e.g., ULTA §§ 1-201(c), (f) with ULTA §§ 2-103(a), (b).
For a commentary on UCC draftsmanship, see Mellinkoff, The Language of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE LJ. 185 (1967).
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(2) the buyer has taken possession of the real estate and
has paid all or a part of the price;
(3) the buyer has accepted an instrument of conveyance
from the seller;
(4) either party, in reasonable reliance upon the con-
tract and upon the continuing assent of the party against
whom enforcement is sought, has changed his position to such
an extent that an unreasonable result can be avoided only by
enforcing the contract; or
(5) the party against whom enforcement is sought admits
in his pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court that the con-
tract for conveyance was made.
This Statute of Frauds provision, again, is modeled after its UCC
counterpart."' Of interest is the fact that the memorandum need not
state the contract price. That may be established by parol evidence.
Of similar interest is subdivision (b)(5) which provides that an oral
contract can be enforced where the party against whom enforcement
is sought makes certain admissions. Some discussion arose as to the
terminology of this provision. Originally, the third line spoke of "a
contract." In the Committee of the Whole a question was asked regard-
ing the possibility that the defendant might be quite willing to admit
that he entered into a contract of sale but on terms differing from
those set forth in the petition or complaint. Professor Dunham agreed
to substitute the phrase "the contract" but stated he regarded the
change as immaterial. His conclusion seems correct. Once the parties
admit that a contract was made, the price and terms can be established
by parol evidence.
Another question sought to elicit the form of the damaging admis-
sion contemplated by subdivision (b)(5). Assume the plaintiff calls the
defendant as a witness, as he can under modern practice acts. The
defendant admits in deposition or in court that a contract was made.
Would this, the question ran, take the case out of the statute? Profes-
sor Benfield answered in the affirmative. This, it is evident, will sub-
stantially limit the impact of the Statute of Frauds.
Indefinite Contracts Enforced
SECTION 2-202. [Indefiniteness; Enforcement of Contract.] A con-
tract to convey does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have
manifested an intent to make a contract and there is a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy, even though the
parties have:
(1) left one or more terms for future agreement; or
61 See UCC § 2-201. e
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(2) not included in the agreement a term dealing with one or
more aspects of the contract.62
In this day and age one learns not to be shocked by a statute
giving a judge the power to fill in the contract where the parties have
omitted terms. But it is shocking to see this radical concept cloaked in
language that speaks of an "appropriate remedy." When the parties
have made a contract, the judge can provide a remedy. When the
parties have failed to make a complete contract and the judge proceeds
to complete it for them, he is doing much more than providing a
remedy.
This section is certainly a departure from existing law, where
for example, if a contract of sale calls for a purchase money mortgage
but fails to state a maturity date, the contract generally cannot be
enforced. Similarly, if a contract of sale were contingent upon the
purchaser obtaining a mortgage of $30,100, but did not state the terms
of the mortgage, the contract could not be enforced. There are a multi-
tude of similar cases where the parties have stated only part of the
contract terms and the courts have declined to supply the balance. 3
An earlier draft of this section followed more closely the language
of UCC section 2-204. This draft was criticized for being unclear as to
whether subjective or objective intention was meant to be controlling.
It was felt that the provision should make it clear that the outward,
objective manifestations of the parties are determinative. Thus, the
term "manifested" was included in the current draft to meet these
objections.
62 This section was modeled after UCC § 2-204.
63 See, e.g., Sweeting v. Campbell, 8 Ill. 2d 54, 132 N.E.2d 523 (1956), where the
majority viewpoint was discussed and adopted. Id. at 57-59, 132 N.E.2d at 524-25. The court
was aware that in some jurisdictions "where a mortgage is to be given as part of the
purchase price and the maturity date is not specified, [the minority view will presume it]
to be payable on demand and specific performance will be decreed." Id. at 58, 132 N.E.2d
at 525.
It has also been held that a contract of sale contingent upon the purchaser obtaining
a mortgage of a stated sum for terms unstated was too vague to be enforceable. Kenimer
v. Thompson, 128 Ga. App. 253, 196 S.E.2d 363 (1973). Numerous cases may be found in
which courts have declined to supply terms left unstated by the parties. See, e.g., Roberts
v. Adams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 312, 80 P.2d 900 (2d Dist. 1958) (provision of lease which pro-
vided for option to purchase for sum payable "as mutually agreed by both parties" held
unenforceable); Cefalu v. Breznik, 15 Ill. 2d 168, 154 N.E.2d 237 (1958) (contract which
provided for payment of "balance in monthly payments" held unenforceable); Murphy
v. Koll Grocery Co., 311 Ky. 770, 225 S.W.2d 466 (1949) (contract calling for a selling
price of $75,000, $5,000 cash, "[t]ime of possession and balance of payment to be arranged
at a later date" held indefinite and unenforceable); Edward H. Snow Dev. Co. v. Oxsheer,
62 N.M. 113, 305 P.2d 727 (1956) (binder held unenforceable where it provided for pay-
ment of balance "as lots are released at purchaser's convenience"); Bentzen v. H.N. Ranch,
Inc., 78 Wyo. 158, 320 P.2d 440 (1958) (contract stating that balance of, price was "payable
by future agreement on or before [a specified date]" held unerforceable).
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Open Price Terms and Firm Offers
SECTMON 2-203. [Open Price Term.]
(a) If they so intend, the parties may conclude a contract to
convey even though the price is not settled. If the price is not
settled, the price is to be determined as stated in subsection (b) if:
(1) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they
fail to agree; or
(2) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market
or appraisal as determined by a third person and it is not so
determined.
(b) Under the conditions stated in subsection (a), the price
of an interest to be conveyed for a fixed term is its fair rental
value, and the price of any other interest is its fair market value.
(c) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a
price to be fixed in good faith.
(d) If a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement
of the parties fails to be fixed through fault of one party, the other
may either treat the agreement to convey as cancelled or fix a rea-
sonable price.
(e) Unless the parties have agreed that a price not settled is to
be fixed or agreed to in the future, there is no contract.
SE CION 2-205. [Firm Offers.]
(a) An offer to buy or convey real estate in a signed writing
which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not
revocable, for lack of consideration during the time stated or if no
time is stated for a reasonable time.
(b) Notwithstanding agreement to the contrary, a term which,
without consideration, gives assurance that an offer will be held
open is enforceable against an offer [sic] who would be a protected
party upon acceptance of his offer, or is an individual offering to
sell his residence, only if the term is separately signed by the
offeror.
(c) Notwithstanding agreement to the contrary, the period of
irrevocability absent consideration may not exceed:
(I) one month if the offeror would be a protected party
upon acceptance of his offer or is an individual offering to sell
his residence, or
(2) six months if the offeror is any other person.
Section 2-20364 was drafted by the Committee of the Whole in
such a way as to make it clear that it applies only where the parties
have agreed that the price was to be fixed in the future. As one Com-
64 This section was modeled after UCC § 2-305.
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missioner pointed out, placing a value on land is quite different from
doing the same with respect to chattels.
Section 2-205 is a firm offer section, modeled after UCC section
2-205, which, however, applies only to offers by merchants. The ULTA
provision was frequently redrafted. The objection constantly offered to
earlier drafts was that a contract signed only by the seller or only by
the buyer is an offer and could be deemed a firm offer if it stated that it
is not revocable for a stated period. This could be a trap to an unwary
home buyer or seller. In the present draft neither an individual selling
his residence nor a protected party is bound unless the firm offer is
contained in a separate document. Whether this will really protect
unsophisticated persons is an unanswered question.
Substantial Performance
The doctrine of "substantial performance" is explicitly incor-
porated into the ULTA. Section 2-301(a) specifically provides that
"[s]eller's performance of the title obligations of Section 2-304 . . . if
applicable, and his substantial performance of other obligations is a
condition to buyer's duty to tender the purchase price." Further,
failure to perform at a fixed time will not in itself discharge the duties
of the other party under the contract unless in the circumstances the
failure amounts to a material breach, or the contract specifically pro-
vides that such a failure will in fact discharge the other party. 5 In this
regard section 2-302(c) states that "[t]he phrase 'time is of the essence'
or other similar general language does not of itself provide specifically
that failure to perform at the time specified discharges the duties of
the other party." This, of course, will lead to the incorporation of
boilerplate clauses reciting such circumstances as sharply rising prices
or interest rates in order to satisfy this provision.
Title Obligations: Non-Leasehold
SECTION 2-304. [Seller's Title Obligation -Other than Lease-
hold.]
(a) This section does not apply to contracts to convey a lease-
hold.
(b) A seller in a contract for conveyance of real estate is obli-
gated that:
(1) the title to the real estate will be marketable at the
time for conveyance;
(2) the deed conveying the real estate contracted for will
not exclude the warranties specified in Section 2-306; and
61ULTA § 2-302(b)(2).
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(3) if the contract is for conveyance of a possessory in-
terest, at the time of delivery of the deed the buyer will be
able to enter into possession without judicial action or breach
of the peace.
(c) An express contract term which states that the seller is to
furnish "good title" or "good and sufficient title" or a title de-
scribed in similar general terms means that the seller is to fur-
nish a marketable title. Recorded and unrecorded interests and
claims which have been extinguished by reason of Article 8 do not
prevent a title from being marketable.
(d) If an agreement expressly or by implication provides for
the conveyance of real estate as distinguished from whatever
interest the seller may have in real estate, a term in the agreement
specifying the form of the instrument of conveyance as a "quit-
claim" deed or other form of conveyance with less than all of the
warranties provided in Section 2-306 does not of itself limit the
obligation of the seller under paragraph (1) of subsection (b) with
respect to the marketability of title, but does limit the remedy of
the buyer on seller's default as to marketability to refusal to accept
the deed and restitution and incidental damages as provided in
Section 2-510(b), but if the buyer accepts a deed which conforms
to the seller's obligation, he may not thereafter make any claim
based on the failure of the grantor's title to be marketable except
to the extent provided in the deed.
(e) Seller must at his expense arrange for and make available
to the buyer, before the date for tender of the deed sufficient evi-
dence and documentation to enable the buyer to determine the
prospect of seller's compliance with the title obligations of the
contract.
(f) The seller performs his obligation under subsection (e)
by furnishing one or more of the following showing the state of
the title as of a time no earlier than the time of contracting:
(1) an abstract of the title history of the real estate;
(2) a report of title or a commitment to insure by a title
insurance company;
(3) a title opinion certificate or report prepared by an
attorney acceptable to the buyer; [and]
[(4) a torrens certificate;]
[(4)][(5)] any other evidence which by usage in the place
where the real estate is located is acceptable as title evidence.
(g) Notwithstanding the fact that the seller is obligated to
furnish or furnishes evidence for inspection by the buyer as to the
state of the title at a time before the time for tender of the deed
by the seller, the seller is obligated to tender, at the time for
tender of the deed, the title required by the contract.
(h) The buyer is entitled to a reasonable time to inspect the
title evidence and documentation before making payment and
accepting the deed.
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(i) There are no warranties of title in a sale made under a
court order unless the order so provides.
Subdivisions (d), (e), and (f) are of interest. At present, "[a]n
agreement to convey by quitclaim deed does not require the vendor
to convey a good title unless the contract shows that the parties in-
tended to contract for the land and not merely for the vendor's interest,
whatever it might be."6  The last four lines of section 2-304(d) pose a
minor problem. It is hornbook law, of course, that all questions of
marketability end with the closing of the transaction. It is not entirely
clear whether these four lines restate this general rule or confine it to
situations where the contract calls for the type of deed described in this
paragraph. In any event a merger clause in the deed should solve this
problem.
Section 2-304(e) places the burden and expense of furnishing evi-
dence of title on the seller, which is contrary to the practice on the
eastern seaboard. In that area, no doubt, the contracts will continue to
require that the purchaser bear this expense.
Subdivision (4) of section 2-304(f) is bracketed because not all states
employ the Torrens system.67 For those states which do utilize this
system, however, the requirement of furnishing a Torrens title will not
be truly adequate for the purposes of this subdivision since the official
certificate of title must always remain with the registrar of titles. Al-
though the seller can furnish a duplicate certificate he will additionally
have to provide other documents relating to such matters as tax and
bankruptcy searches and judgment liens which may appear on the
official certificate but not on the seller's duplicate. More than likely,
contracts of sale will ignore this section and set forth in detail the type
of evidence of title to be furnished.
Warranties of Title
SECTION 2-306. [Warranty of Title in Deed.] A seller who exe-
cutes a deed not providing to the contrary impliedly warrants that:
(1) the real estate is free from all encumbrances;
(2) the buyer will have quiet and peacable [sic] possession of
or right to enjoy the real estate conveyed;
66 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 184(d) (1955) (footnotes omitted).
67 The Torrens system of land registration provides for the registration of title
rather than instruments of conveyance by which title is transferred. Title is transferred
only by a surrender of the existing certificate of title to the registrar who in turn issues
a new certificate. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. AxN. § 508.01 et seq. (1970).
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(8) the seller had power and right to convey the title which
he purported to convey; and
(4) the seller will defend the title to the real estate conveyed
against all persons lawfully claiming it.
Section 2-306 makes all deeds general warranty deeds unless the
deed provides to the contrary. Undoubtedly, in areas such as New York
City and California, where general warranty deeds are a rarity, the
deeds will "provide to the contrary." This provision must be read in
conjunction with section 2-304 which provides that unless the seller
has specifically contracted to convey a deed with lesser warranty of
title obligation, he must give a deed under which the buyer receives
the warranties specified in this section.
Title Obligations: Leasehold
SECTION 2-307. [Obligation as to Title; Leaseholds.] The seller
of a leasehold warrants that
(1) If a possessory interest is being conveyed, the buyer will
be able to take possession at the beginning of the term without
judicial action or breach of the peace;
(2) if an interest other than a possessory interest is being con-
veyed, the buyer will be able to enjoy fully the real estate at the
beginning of the term;
(3) the buyer will have quiet and peaceable possession or
right to enjoy the real estate; and
(4) the seller has power and right to convey the interest being
conveyed except that the seller of a term of five years or less does
not warrant against the existence of a security interest or lien
having priority over the buyers interest.
With regard to leaseholds, section 2-307 provides that the lessor
warrants to put the tenant in quiet possession or quiet enjoyment,
depending on the possessory nature of the lease at the beginning of the
term. This position follows closely that of the proposed Restatement
Second of Property.68 Specifically omitted, however, are any warran-
ties against encumbrances running against short term leases. As the
Comment to this section indicates, the existence of an encumbrance
such as a mortgage in the typical short term lease is not generally con-
sidered a breach unless under the circumstances the lessee's right to
enjoyment would be substantially threatened.69
68 REsrATEmENT (SEcoNm) or PROPERTY § 6.2 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1974).
00 ULTA § 2-807, Comment 3.
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Express and Implied Warranties
SECTION 2-308. [Express Warranties of Quality.]
(a) Express warranties by a seller are created as follows:
(1) any affirmation of fact or promise which becomes a
part of the basis of the bargain relating to the real estate, its
use or rights appurtenant thereto, area improvements which
would directly benefit the property, or the right to use or
have the benefit of facilities not located on the premises,
creates an express warranty that the real estate and related
rights and uses will conform to the affirmation or promise;
(2) any sample or model, or description of the physical
characteristics of the real estate, including plans and specifica-
tions of or for improvements which are part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the real estate will
conform to the sample, model, or description;
(3) any description of the quantity or extent of the real
estate including plats or surveys which is part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the real estate
will conform to the description, subject to customary toler-
ances;
(4) a provision that a buyer may put the real estate only
to a specified use is an express warranty that the specified use
is lawful.
(b) Neither formal words, such as "warranty", or "guarantee",
nor a specific intention to make a warranty are necessary for the
making of an express warranty, but a statement purporting to be
merely an opinion or commendation of the real estate or its value
does not create a warranty.
SECTION 2-309. [Implied Warranty of Quality.]
(a) Subject to the provisions on risk of loss (Section 2-406), a
seller warrants that the real estate will be in at least as good condi-
tion at the time of the earlier of delivery of possession or convey-
ance, as it was at the time of contracting, reasonable wear and tear
excepted.
(b) A seller, other than a lessor, who is in the business of sell-
ing real estate impliedly warrants that the real estate is suitable for
the ordinary uses of real estate of its type and that any improve-
ments made or contracted for by him will be:
(1) free from defective materials; and
(2) constructed in accordance with applicable law, ac-
cording to sound engineering and construction standards,
and in a workmanlike manner.
(c) A seller in the business of selling real estate warrants to a
protected party that an existing use, continuation of which is
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contemplated by the parties, does not, at the earlier of conveyance
or delivery of possession, violate applicable law.
(d) Warranties imposed by this Section may be excluded or
modified as provided in the Section on exclusion or modification
at warranties of quality (Section 2-311).
(e) For the purposes of this section, improvements made or
contracted for by a person related to the seller (Section 1-204) are
treated as if they were made or contracted for by the seller.
(f) A person who extends credit secured by real estate and
acquires real estate by foreclosure of, in lieu of foreclosure of, his
security interest, does not become a person in the business of sell-
ing real estate by reason of selling that real estate.
SEGrION 2-310. [Lender's Obligation as to Improvements.] A
lender who loans money that is or may be used to finance the
design, manufacture, construction, repair, modification or other
improvement of real estate for sale or lease is not liable solely by
reason of making the loan for any loss or damage caused by any
defect in the real estate or for any loss or damage resulting from
the failure by another person to use reasonable care in the design,
manufacture, construction, repair, modification, or other improve-
ment of the real estate.
SEcTON 2-311. [Exclusion or Modification of Warranties of
Quality.]
(a) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty of quality and words or conduct tending to negate or
limit the warranty shall be construed wherever possible as con-
sistent with each other; but, subject to the provisions on parol or
extrinsic evidence (Section 1-306), negation or limitation is inop-
erative to the extent that construction is unreasonable.
(b) Except as limited by subsection (c) with respect to a pro-
tected party, implied warranties of quality:(1) may be excluded or modified by agreement of the
parties, and
(2) are excluded by expressions of disclaimer such as
"as is", "with all faults", or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of
warranties.
(c) With respect to a protected party, no disclaimer of im-
plied warranties of quality in general language or in the language
of the warranty as set out in this Act is effective, but a seller may
disclaim liability for particular and specified defects or specified
failures to comply with applicable law if the defects or failure to
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comply entered into and became a part of the basis of the bargain.
(d) Notwithstanding any rule of evidence, written acknowl-
edgement by a protected party that he has contracted to buy after
the disclosure of specific defects or failures to comply with ap-
plicable law set forth in the writing and which were specifically
called to his attention before contracting, creates only a presump-
tion that the particular or specified failures to comply with ap-
plicable law set forth in the writing were specifically a part of the
basis of the bargain and the parties may offer any evidence rele-
vant to that issue.
(e) Any disclaimer of warranties is also subject to the provi-
sions on unconscionability (Section 1-311) even though the seller
has complied with subsections (b) or (c).
(f) If a buyer, other than a protected party, before contracting
has examined the real estate or a sample or model as fully as he
desired or, after receiving a written request to do so, has failed to
make an examination, there is no implied warranty with regard
to any defect that an examination by him in the circumstances
ought to have revealed.
SECTION 2-312. [Third Party Beneficiaries and Assignment of War-
ranty.]
(a) A seller's warranty of title extends to the buyer and his
successors in title.
(b) The benefit of a seller's warranty of quality extends to
the following individuals who suffer bodily injury by reason of
a breach of the warranty:
(1) successors in title of the buyer;
(2) residents in the household of the buyer or his succes-
sors in title.
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this subsection.
(c) Notwithstanding any agreement that only the immediate
buyer shall have the benefit of warranties of quality with respect
to the real estate, or that warranties received from a prior seller
shall not pass to the buyer, a conveyance of real estate transfers to
the buyer all warranties of quality made by prior sellers, but any
rights the seller may have against prior sellers for loss incurred
before the conveyance may be reserved by the seller either ex-
pressly or by implication from the circumstances.
(d) A seller's warranty of quality to a protected party extends
to any successor in title of the protected party unaffected by any
disclaimer or limitation of liability of which the successor had no
reason to know at the time of the conveyance to the successor.
SECTION 2-313. [Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties Express
or Implied.] Warranties, whether express or implied, shall be con-
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strued as consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if that
construction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall de-
termine which warranty is dominant.
SECnON 2-314. [Other Liability Not Determined by This Act.]
Nothing in this Act determines or affects the liability or non-
liability in tort of a seller to any person including the buyer,
arising apart from this Act for injury to the person, death, prop-
erty damage, or other loss caused by a condition of the real estate
including any improvement made or arranged for by the seller of
the real estate.
Sections 2-308 through 2-314 deal exhaustively with the subject
of warranties.70 An undefined phrase that recurs throughout these
sections is "basis of the bargain."
One commentator on the law of sales has determined that "basis
of the bargain" refers to the entire setting of the transaction, including
statements made before and after the sale occurs.71 This naturally
creates a serious problem under the parol evidence rule and may not
be entirely appropriate to real estate transactions. 72 One immediate
example of some of the difficulties which can flow from this general
proposition is evidenced by section 2-308(a)(3) which speaks of descrip-
tions of the quantity or extent of real estate as part of the basis of the
bargain. Under existing law it is arguable that representations as to
acreage would not be part of the basis of the bargain if the sale is in
gross rather than by the acre.73 It is unclear at this point whether the
draftsmen of the ULTA mean to change this rule.
70 See generally S.F. Bowser & Co. v. McCormack, 230 App. Div. 303, 243 N.Y.S. 443
(4th Dep't 1930), where the court suggests
that the implied warranty, instead of being a part of the contract to which it
attaches itself, is the law's contribution to the welfare of the parties beyond the
terms of the contract itself. Or, to put it another way, the implied warranty is not
read into the contract as part and parcel thereof, but is a legal fiction invented to
prevent the seller from loading a fraud onto a contract which, by its terms, would
not be able to combat the fraud.
Id. at 306, 243 N.Y.S. at 445.
71 See R. Noansroxs, LAW or SATEs §§ 66-68, at 203-12 (1970).
72 In this regard, it has been suggested that even if a contract of sale includes an
express disclaimer of warranties and a standard merger clause a court can nevertheless
look to the circumstances surrounding the sale to ascertain whether the parties in fact
"intended" the contract in question to be a final expression of their agreement. If the
court finds that they (one or the other) did not, evidence can be taken on the question
of what else took place which may have constituted a basis for the bargain. Id. § 69, at
213-16 (1970).
73 Relying on this distinction, some courts have been more reluctant than others
to grant equitable relief based on a mistake as to the quantity of land to be conveyed.
Compare Hunter v. Keightley, 184 Ky. 835, 213 S.W. 201 (1919) (equitable relief granted
where no fraud or misrepresentation was involved), with Rich v. Scales, 116 Tenn. 57, 91
S.W. 50 (1905) (equitable relief granted but only because sale was by acre).
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The reference to "customary tolerances" in the same section also
raises questions. Throughout the country various semi-official stan-
dards for land surveys exist. However, there is no uniformity with
respect to "tolerances." In general, a higher order of accuracy is re-
quired in surveys of valuable urban land than in sales of farm land.74
Section 2-311(c) guards the protected party against a general dis-
claimer of the implied warranty of quality."5 However, it should be
noted that this provision does not prevent, but in fact anticipates, a
contractual modification of remedies. In this regard, the provisions of
this section are not to be construed as in any way inconsistent with the
use of new home insured warranty clauses which are offered by some
home builders."
Contractual limitations of the warranty of quality are further
restricted by section 2-312(b) in those cases where a breach has resulted
in bodily injury. This section abandons the requirement of horizontal
privity, in that it extends the protection of the warranty to individuals
residing in the household of the buyer, and it abolishes the require-
ment of vertical privity, in that it extends the protection of the war-
ranty to successors in title of the buyer.77
Termination and Cancellation: Notice of Breach
Part 4 of article II deals with breach, repudiation, and excuse and
will be seen to parallel its counterparts in the UCC.78 With regard to
notice of breach, however, the ULTA does not impose upon the buyer
the same "reasonable time" limitations for notifying the seller that
are present in the UCC. 9 The reason for this distinction rests pri-
marily on the nature of real estate transactions, since claims for small
defects are not likely to be asserted unless and until a major subse-
quent defect is discovered. Similarly, there is no time limitation for
notice with regard to major defects, the drafters having felt that there
was no way to effectively separate the two within this provision. The
seller, however, is not at a total disadvantage since the general obliga-
tion of the parties to deal in good faith will effectively serve to limit
his liability where the delay in giving notification of a breach can be
shown to have been in bad faith.80
74 See, e.g., Illinois Land Survey Standards, 57 ILL. BJ. 327 (1968).
75 Cf. UCC § 2-316(2). For a general discussion of the UCC section, see Ford Motor
Co. v. Moulton, _ Tenn. .. _, 511 S.W.2d 690, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974)
(general disclaimer upheld in warranty action involving personal injuries).
76 See ULTA § 2-311, Comment.
77 See generally R. NosmsraoM, LAW oF SALES §§ 90-92, at 278-89 (1970).
78 Compare ULTA §§ 2-402 and -405 with UCC §§ 2-608 to -611.
79 Compare ULTA § 2-401 with UCC § 2-607.
80 See ULTA § 2-401, Comment.
[Vol. 49:460
UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT
Frustration and Impracticality
SEMCION 2-407. [Excuse by Impracticality.] Delay in performance
or non-performance in whole or in part is not a breach of duty
under a contract for sale of real estate if performance as agreed
has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency
the risk of which the parties did not assume would be borne by
the party whose performance has been made impracticable.
This section brings into the ULTA the concepts of commercial
frustration and impracticability embodied in UCC section 2-615. It
has been said that the principle of unjust enrichment, which is the
basis of quasi-contractual liability, has its counterpart in the principle
of unjust impoverishment as reflected in the impracticability doctrine.8'
Insofar as frustration is concerned, it has been argued that this prin-
ciple should be used only as a safety valve which is moved only by the
pressure of war and other catastrophic events.82
These two concepts are treated at length by both Professor Corbin
and the Restatement of Contracts.83 The subject bristles with contro-
versy and obviously there is no room here for an in-depth analysis.
One point, however, deserves comment. Both the ULTA and the UCC
speak only in terms of future (or "supervening") frustration or im-
practicability. Not discussed is another type of impracticability and
frustration -that which may already have existed, unknown to the
obligor, at the time of contracting. Where courts have treated this
problem, they have often done so on the theory that the impossibility
(or impracticability so extreme that it amounts to impossibility) con-
stitutes a mutual mistake as to the basis of the bargain for which
neither party had assumed the risk.84 In any event, it will remain for
the courts to determine how this special type of impracticability will
be read into the ULTA.
81 See Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 CoLum. L. REv. 903, 950
(1942).
82 1d. at 954.
83 6 A. Comm, CoNTRAers § 1331 et seq. (1964). See also RrSrATmrr (SEcoND) OF
CoNTRAcrs § 281 et seq. and introductory note to ch. 11 (1972).
84 See, e.g., Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 51 Cal. 856, 156 P. 458 (1916),
noted in 4 CAuF. L. REv. 404, 407 (1916). In this case, the defendant contracted to take
from the plaintiff's land all the gravel which he would require for a certain construction
project. Defendant further agreed to pay for the gravel at an agreed rate per cubic yard.
Unknown to both parties at the time of contracting was the fact that a substantial
amount of the gravel was below water level. When this condition was discovered by
defendant, he began using gravel from another landsite. The court held that the defendant
was excused from performance when he showed that he had removed all available gravel
above water level and that to take the remainder would cost 10 to 12 times the expected
cost.
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Remedies
Seller's and buyer's remedies are treated in part 5 of article II.
The most significant aspect of these provisions is the virtual elimina-
tion of the earnest money concept as it has traditionally existed in the
law of vendor and purchaser.85 In this regard sections 2-504 and 2-516
must be read in close conjunction with one another:
SECTION 2-504. [Seller's Resale Including Contract for Resale.]
(a) Under the conditions stated in Section 2-502(a) on seller's
remedies, a seller may resell the real estate concerned. If the
resale is made in good faith and in a reasonable manner the seller
may recover the difference between the resale price and the con-
tract price together with any incidental damages allowed under
the provisions of Section 2-507, less expenses saved in consequence
of the buyer's breach.
(b) Unless otherwise agreed, resale may be at public or
private sale. Sale may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time
and place and on any terms, but every aspect of the sale, includ-
ing the method, manner, time, place and terms must be reason-
able.
(c) If the resale is at private sale, the seller must give the
buyer reasonable notification of his intention to resell and of time
after which sale will take place.
(d) If the resale is at public sale, the buyer must be given
reasonable notification of the time and place of the sale and the
seller may buy.
(e) A purchaser who buys in good faith at a resale takes the
real estate free of any rights of the original buyer even though
the seller fails to comply with one or more of the requirements of
this section.
(f) A seller is not accountable to the buyer for any profit
made on any resale.
SECTION 2-516. [Liquidation of Damages; Deposits.]
(a) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated
in the agreement but only at an amount which is not unreasonable
in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the
breach, the time the real estate is withheld from the market, the
difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience of [sic] non-
feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void.
(b) A party entitled to recover under a valid liquidated
damages clause has no other remedy for any breach by the other
party to which the liquidated damages clause applies.
85 Cf. 5A A. CORBN, CoNTRACrs § 1122 et seq. (1964).
[Vol. 49:460
UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT
(c) Whenever a seller justifiably withholds conveyance of
real estate because of the buyer's breach, the buyer is entitled to
restitution of any amount by which the sum of his payments
exceeds the amount to which the seller is entitled by virtue of
terms liquidating the seller's damages in accordance with sub-
section (a).
(d) The buyer's right of restitution under subsection (c) is
subject to offset to the extent of:
(1) the seller's right to recover damages under the provi-
sions of this Artide other than subsection (a); and
(2) the amount or value of any benefits received by the
buyer under the contract.
(e) If a seller has received payment in property other than
money, its reasonable value or the proceeds of its sale shall be
treated as payments for the purposes of subsection (c).
The ULTA position looks to contractually determined liquidated
damages clauses which cannot be unreasonable in light of anticipated
actual harm. The defaulting buyer is specifically given a right to resti-
tution of any payments which exceed this amount. In eliminating the
earnest money concept, the drafters have effectively failed to distin-
guish between installment and cash sale contracts. In cash sale con-
tracts the earnest money concept has worked well. The proof of this
lies in the paucity of case law compelling a vendor to disgorge earnest
money. The conceptual error of those who choose to treat this as a
liquidated damages problem was revealed by Professor Corbin long
ago.88 When a purchaser defaults, the vendor simply retains earnest
money already in his hands. When a contract provides for liquidated
damages, the injured party must often sue to recover such damages.
To set a court in motion is quite a different matter from leaving the
parties where they have voluntarily placed themselves. Since a de-
faulting purchaser has no right of restitution as long as the vendor has
a right of specific performance,8 7 the well-advised vendor will obvi-
ously always contract for a right of specific performance.
It is a legitimate inference that the ULTA thinking on earnest
money is based on the views of Justice Traynor as set forth in
86 Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid,
40 YALE LJ. 1013, 1028-31 (1931).
87 5A A. Comm, CONmhACrs § 1130 (1964). It was pointed out by Corbin that once art
enforceable contract for sale has been entered into
[n]either by a repudiation nor by mere failure to pay installments when due,
can the vendee terminate the vendor's right to payment of the full price -his
right to specific performance .... [The vendee] cannot recover back money that
he has paid if it is money that the vendor could still compel him to pay if as
yet unpaid.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish.s8
The Freedman court took the position that any measure of damages
must be rationally tied to compensating the injured party for actual
harm done and not result in forfeitures which are, in effect, unjusti-
fiable penalties for breaching the contract. However, this position has
been severely criticized 9 and is not likely to be well received by the
real estate bar.
CONCLUSION
As stated at the outset, the purpose of this article has been to
acquaint the bar with the emergence of a proposed uniform state code
on real estate transactions. It is hoped that the foregoing brief com-
mentary on the first two articles of the ULTA has helped unveil its
fundamentally new approach to the law of real estate transactions.
Simply stated, this approach is a general attempt to mold the laws
controlling real estate transactions after the UCC. The proposed
abolition of the earnest money concept and the reliance on resale as a
remedy, which is central to much of the thinking in article II, are just
two examples of this attempt to bring commercial and real estate law
under one umbrella.
The validity of the assumption that there is a basic similarity
between real estate and chattel transactions has yet to be determined.
It is certain that many of the provisions contained in the ULTA will
not be accepted without much heated debate. In any event, the exten-
sion of UCC concepts to real estate transactions through the ULTA
will be a revolution within the industry.
88 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
89 See Hefland, The California Land Contract, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1960).
